Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10ANKARA126
2010-01-26 11:11
2010-12-30 21:09
SECRET
Embassy Ankara

VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHAK #0126/01 0261123
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 261123Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 1558
RUEHKB/AMEMBASSY BAKU PRIORITY 1658
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 1090
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0180
RUEHYE/AMEMBASSY YEREVAN PRIORITY 1404
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL PRIORITY 6834
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1844
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHAK/USDAO ANKARA TU PRIORITY
RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
S E C R E T ANKARA 000126

SIPDIS

FOR BACKGROUND

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2020
TAGS: PREL PGOV MASS MARR TU AF PK IR IZ IS AM
SUBJECT: SECRETARY GATES' TURKEY BILATERAL VISIT:
SCENESETTER

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Jeffrey, Reasons 1.4 (a,b,d)

1. (S) PM Erdogan welcomed President Obama's reiteration of
support to the fight against the PKK during the December 7
meeting in the Oval Office, but the Secretary should expect
questions about how we will operationalize that commitment as
plans to withdraw from Iraq move forward. A key issue will
be how to reduce the gap between the time when the U.S. is no
longer able to provide ISR support and when we will be able
to help Turkey acquire its own capability. On missile
defense, we will look for the Secretary's help in advancing
our work with Turkey to persuade the Turks to allow a key
radar system to be based here. The Turks are struggling to
define what they will need in terms of NATO political cover
to lessen the high cost - both in terms of domestic politics
and in relations with Iran - that Erdogan's government
believes it will have to pay should they agree.

2. (S) Although our agenda with Turkey is broad and complex,
the following issues are likely to come up during the
Secretary's trip:

"Need To Raise"
----------------

- Our commitment to continue sharing real-time intelligence
to support Turkey's counter-PKK fight, but caution that the
process for Turkey to acquire an armed UAV system from the
U.S. will be long and complex. (para 3-5, 14)

- The need for a NATO BMD system with Turkey's participation
and the Iranian threat against NATO interests. (para 6-9)

- Appreciation for Turkey's efforts on Afghanistan/Pakistan,
particularly for its new commitments to training security
forces. (para 10-11)

- Appreciation for support to OIF/OEF through Turkey's
territory, including the Incirlik Cargo Hub; easing transit
of non-lethal mil cargo shipments from Iraq to Afghanistan.
(para 12)

- Our advocacy support for Raytheon and Sikorsky on sales of
air defense systems and utility helicopters (para 13).

"Be Ready To Respond On"
------------------------
- Pressure for direct U.S. milops against the PKK (paras 5)

- Turkish requests for 24/7 Predator coverage of the
Turkey-Iraq border to counter PKK operations and activities
(para 5).
- Turkish requests for immediate delivery of AH-1W
helicopters (para 15)

Counter - PKK Operations: Still Turkey's Top Priority
--------------------------------------------- --------

3. (C) Turkey's counter-terrorist efforts against the PKK
have evolved in the past year and have expanded beyond
military action alone. Although the government's renamed
National Unity Project (initially called the "Kurdish
Opening") was not fully developed when launched and appears
to be moving slowly, the government has increased social and
economic support to ethnic Kurds in southeast Turkey,
dramatically broadened the rights of Kurds to use their own
language, and increased educational opportunities as well.
It is post's view that the military success against the PKK,
supported by our intelligence-sharing operation, has given
the civilians the political space to explore this opening and
to deal directly with Masoud Barzani and other Iraqi Kurds.
Turkish military operations against the PKK continue,
however, and on October 6, 2009 Parliament extended the
government's mandate to conduct cross-border operations
against the PKK in Iraq for another year. Turkey's leaders
have learned from us and from their own experience that only
a whole-of-government approach will succeed against the PKK
insurgency.
4. (C) Our November 2007 decision to share operational
intelligence was a turning point for the bilateral
relationship, and President Obama's declaration before the
Turkish Parliament in April 2009 and during his oval office
meeting with Erdogan in December 2009 of our continuing
commitment to support Turkey's fight against the PKK were
warmly welcomed. Our cooperation has helped to improve the
bilateral relationship across the board, particularly by
making it difficult for PKK terrorists to use northern Iraq
as a safe haven. We can never reiterate enough our
continuing committment, as President Obama did effectively
with PM Erdogan in December.

5. (C) Nevertheless, Turkish causalities are still occurring.
Turkey still looks for more support, and will press us for
more concrete action before the U.S. completes its withdrawal
from Iraq. CHOD Basbug will likely repeat the GOT's request
for laser-designation of targets and/or direct U.S.
operations against the PKK. In December, PM Erdogan also
asked POTUS for 24-hour Predator coverage. At present we
provide approximately 12-hour coverage, with an occasional
surge to 24 hours to support specific Turkish operations,
such as against High Value Targets. A move to 24-hour
coverage is not easy due to resources requirements elsewhere;
however, we may be able to provide a few weeks of 24-hour
coverage during crucial spring months, and are working with
TGS to determine exactly where and when it would be most
useful to do so, and what assets the Turkish military would
employ if additional UAV support is made available.

ئه‌م وێنه‌یه‌ هی کاتی ‌هێرشه‌که‌ی سۆپای تورکیایه‌ بۆ قه‌ندیل (شه‌ری زاب)
به‌چکه‌ وورچێک له‌ شاخی قه‌ندیل دایکی ورچه‌که‌ به‌ بوردومانی تورکه‌کان ده‌کوژرێت
گه‌ریلایه‌کی په‌که‌که‌ شیر به‌ به‌ به‌چکه وورچه‌که‌‌ ئه‌دات